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Toward the Personalization of Copyright
Law
Adi Libson† & Gideon Parchomovsky††
In this Essay, we provide a blueprint for personalizing copyright law in order
to reduce the deadweight loss that stems from its universal application to all users,
including those who would not have paid for it. We demonstrate how big data can
help identify inframarginal users, who would not pay for copyrighted content, and
we explain how copyright liability and remedies should be modified in such cases.
INTRODUCTION
The dominant justification for copyright protection is that it
is necessary to remedy an underproduction problem that arises
from the public-good nature of expressive works.1 According to
economic theory, public goods display two characteristics: non-
rival consumption and nonexcludability of benefits.2 The former
trait implies that the use of a copyrighted work by one individ-
ual does not diminish consumption opportunities for others. The
latter means that even users who did not pay for the provision of
copyrighted content benefit from it. Furthermore, once a work is
produced, it can be copied by others and offered to the public at
a price that does not allow the original authors to recoup the in-
vestment required to produce the work. Without legal protec-
tion, therefore, not enough copyrighted works would be created.
The legal exclusivity granted to copyright owners is intended
to prevent unauthorized use of copyrighted content and ensure
that authors are remunerated for their creative labors. The
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authors’ monetary rewards come from voluntary market trans-
actions between the authors and users of the works. To prevent
attempts at bypassing the market, copyright law imposes sanc-
tions on unauthorized users of copyrighted material.3
Critically, though, from an economic perspective, our copy-
right system does not represent a first-best solution. The grant
of legal exclusivity to authors introduces the problem of su-
pracompetitive (or monopolistic) pricing. Consequently, users
who would have been willing to buy at the competitive price are
denied access to content. And the penalties that are imposed on
all unauthorized users come with a social cost: they drive away
potential users of copyrighted content who derive positive value
but cannot afford to pay the asking price. Preventing such users
from accessing copyrighted works decreases their welfare with-
out enhancing the creators’ incentives to create because these
potential users never provide any revenue for sellers.
The existence of big data regarding the characteristics of
copyright users can fundamentally transform copyright law by
significantly decreasing its social cost. Big data can facilitate the
personalization of copyright law via differentiating between pay-
ing users, who potentially attribute a higher value to the content
than the asking price, and inframarginal users, who most likely
will attribute a lower value to the content than the asking price
and barely participate actively in the copyright market. Copy-
right law could differentiate between the penalties that would
be imposed on different types of users who infringe copyrights,
imposing high penalties on the paying user and low penalties on
the inframarginal user. Such personalization is welfare enhanc-
ing, compared to the existing regime, as it will increase the use
of copyrighted content.
The use of big data can also help bring about a fairer and
more efficient copyright enforcement regime. At present, all un-
authorized users are treated similarly, irrespective of whether
they would have paid for the right to use the work. While en-
forcement against users who could afford to pay the asking price
is vital for the successful operation of our copyright system, the
imposition of sanctions on inframarginal users is welfare dimin-
ishing, as it denies them a benefit that inflicts no harm on
3 See 17 USC § 504. See also Landes and Posner, 18 J Legal Stud at 328–29 (cited
in note 1) (discussing the market dynamics between the author’s assumption of copyright
protection for her work and the disincentive created by the potential that the work will
be copied without authorization).
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copyright owners. A prior study by one of us suggested personal-
izing copyright protection by granting copyright holders a basic
set of protections and allowing them to decide whether to pur-
chase additional levels of protection.4 In this proposal, we sug-
gest personalizing copyright protection based on certain charac-
teristics of copyright users through the utilization of big data.
We analyze data that contain demographic characteristics of
consumers of copyrighted content in order to detect cohorts that
abstain from purchasing such content. We focus on purchases of
audio and video content. We utilize two sources of data that com-
plement one another. The first source is data from the Consumer
Expenditure Survey of the Bureau of Labor Statistics, which
provide us with a general picture of audio and video purchases.5
The second is panel data from ComScore, which include detailed
information regarding the online consumption patterns of over
eighty thousand households from various backgrounds, includ-
ing their full demographic characteristics. Analysis of these data
sets enables us to detect potential groups with a low propensity
to purchase copyrighted material based on cross-sections of de-
mographic categories, such as household education and racial
background.
Our empirical analysis is only the first step in utilizing big
data for the purpose of personalizing copyright law. In order to
identify accurately the individuals who would not purchase copy-
righted content, it is necessary to work with a much bigger data
set than that which was available to us. Concretely, one would
need to establish or compile a more comprehensive data set based
on a larger sample that includes panel data and maybe even be-
havioral categories. It would also be useful to create a data set
that tracks the consumption of different genres. The purpose of
our admittedly partial analysis is only to demonstrate the gen-
eral feasibility of deducing from even basic demographic data
the probability that a certain household would not buy copy-
righted materials and the general form in which a personalized
copyright regime should be molded.
Our argument and results give rise to several implications
for legal policy. First, by enabling differential pricing of
4 Abraham Bell and Gideon Parchomovsky, Reinventing Copyright and Patent, 113
Mich L Rev 231, 255–59 (2014).
5 See Table 1110. Deciles of Income before Taxes: Annual Expenditure Means,
Shares, Standard Errors, and Coefficients of Variation, Consumer Expenditure Survey,
2016 (Bureau of Labor Statistics, Aug 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/S5BK-9KAU.
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copyrighted content, personalized consumption data will reduce
the deadweight loss associated with copyright protection. Se-
cond, the consumption patterns we report suggest that a more
limited copyright regime should apply to certain cohorts with a
lower propensity to purchase content. Third, and relatedly,
based on our findings, we propose varying the sanctions imposed
for unauthorized uses of copyrighted content based on user
characteristics.
Structurally, our Essay is comprised of five parts. In Part I,
we present the data sources that offer information about the
consumption patterns of copyrighted content and the character-
istics of the consumers. In Part II, we analyze the data we col-
lected and summarize our empirical findings. In Part III, we dis-
cuss the significance, as well as the limitations, of our findings.
In Part IV, we assess the implications of our findings for copy-
right law and policy. In Part V, we explain why the market alone
would not lead to a full personalization of copyright law and
hence why legal intervention is warranted. In the Conclusion, we
identify the central attribute of our argument and briefly ad-
dress its applicability to the consumption of other public goods.
I. GENERAL AND EXPENDITURE SURVEY DATA
Until recently, user-specific pricing was considered a purely
theoretical possibility, and its implementation in the real world
was deemed unrealistic.6 The emergence of big data regarding
the characteristics of users of copyrighted works will go a long
way toward turning this theoretical possibility into reality.
There exist abundant data regarding the characteristics of vari-
ous types of users who consume music and movies.
Since 2016, online listening has been the most dominant form
of music consumption.7 According to the 2016 Nielsen Music
Year-End Report, on-demand audio streaming comprises 38 per-
cent of total audio consumption in the United States.8 It is on
the rise, and a steep rise it is: it has grown 76.4 percent relative
6 See Joel Waldfogel, First Degree Price Discrimination Goes to School, 63 J Indust
Econ 569, 569 (2015) (“Person-specific pricing, also known as ‘first-degree price discrimina-
tion,’ is discussed in essentially every microeconomics textbook and class, but it is normally
invoked more as an intellectual benchmark than as an example of real-world pricing.”). The
economist Arthur Pigou has termed user-specific pricing “discrimination of the first de-
gree.” See A.C. Pigou, The Economics of Welfare 278–80 (Macmillan 4th ed 1932).
7 Nielsen Music Year-End Report, U.S. 2016 *3 (Nielsen, Jan 9, 2017), archived at
http://perma.cc/KED8-2G7E.
8 Id.
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to the figures from 2015.9 Movie and video consumption has also
shifted toward streaming: 2016 was the first year in which the
majority of Americans (50.8 percent) watched a TV show online
at least once a month.10 This is a 3 percentage point jump from
2015, in which only 47.8 percent of Americans watched a show
online at least once a month.11 According to the 2017 Nielsen
Video 360° Report, 52 percent of survey respondents claimed
that they had not purchased a physical video in 2016.12 Online
streaming consumption significantly increases the ability to
track and extract specific information regarding the characteris-
tics (name, geographic location, age, gender, and many more) and
behavior of the consumer through obtaining browser activity and
cross-checking with other databases, such as credit-score bu-
reaus and online consumption of alternative services.
The high commercial value of the information regarding the
characteristics of consumers of music and movies has prompted
business enterprises, such as ComScore,13 Quantcast,14 and
Musicwatch,15 to establish big data sets on users. Other busi-
nesses, such as Tellapart, have collected general data regarding
consumers’ characteristics and behavior and advised firms on
how to utilize this information.16 While this information is avail-
able, it is very expensive to obtain due to its high commercial
value.17 In this Essay, we utilize a large set of data collected by
ComScore in order to demonstrate the feasibility of detecting the
profiles of consumers with a low probability of purchasing
9 Id at *6.
10 For the First Time, More than Half of Americans Will Watch Streaming TV
(eMarketer, Feb 3, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/GNF7-6HBU.
11 Id.
12 Video 360° 2017 Report Highlights *2 (Nielsen, Aug 24, 2017), archived at
http://perma.cc/7VWG-9E2A.
13 Audience Analytics (ComScore, 2018), archived at http://perma.cc/5HU3-ANAN.
14 Quantcast Audience Grid: The Open Data Platform for Digital Advertising
(Quantcast, 2018), archived at http://perma.cc/BR4F-ZFX8.
15 Research Studies (MusicWatch, 2018), archived at http://perma.cc/VRJ3-ZDP4.
16 TellApart, acquired by Twitter in 2015, used commerce data to help companies
personalize their advertisement campaigns. See Twitter to Acquire TellApart (Twitter,
2018), archived at http://perma.cc/P94D-NQFS. For information regarding a business
providing similar services that TellApart took over—Freshplum—and other competitors,
see Adam Tanner, Different Customers, Different Prices, Thanks to Big Data (Forbes,
Mar 26, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/UW5W-WQS6.
17 For example, the cost of ComScore panel data for one year, which is the data an-
alyzed in this Essay, is $20,000 even for academic institutions. The same panel data for
a range of a few years can reach $100,000, and this is relatively cheap compared to more
expensive behavioral data ComScore offers regarding users’ browsing activity and not
only their purchasing behavior.
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copyrighted content.18 Our data set focuses on the purchase of
audio and video content. The analysis of the ComScore data is in-
structive of how it is possible to utilize existing big data to detect
population segments with a low propensity to purchase copy-
righted content. In addition, we use Bureau of Labor Statistics
Expenditure Survey data, which is a useful complement to our
other data sources, although it is less extensive than the
ComScore data.19 We utilize an analysis of the 2010 Bureau of
Labor Statistics Expenditure Survey data published by New
Strategist in Best Customers: Demographics of Consumer
Demand.20
According to the Best Customers data, while the expendi-
ture of an average household on audio streaming and download-
ing is $6.70, households in which the householder is age
seventy-five and above spend an average of $0.55.21 In contrast,
the average monthly spending of households in which the
householder is age thirty-five to forty-four is $10.81—almost
twenty times as much.22 The Best Customers Index score—
which is based on the ratio of the groups’ average expenditures
to the general population’s average expenditures,23 indicating
the group’s propensity to make purchases in a given category—
is 8 for the former group and 161 for the latter.24
Households with annual incomes of less than $20,000 spend
less than a third of what the average household spends on audio
streaming and downloads.25 The average household spends an
average of $6.70 per month on streaming and downloading mu-
sic, while households with annual incomes of less than $20,000
spend an average of $1.90.26 In contrast, households with annual
incomes of $100,000 or more spend over three times more than
the average household on copyrighted content online, and over
ten times more than households with incomes of less than
18 Consumption Analysis (ComScore, Apr 18, 2018), online at http://wrds
-web.wharton.upenn.edu/wrds (Perma archive unavailable) (visited Dec 31, 2018).
19 Table 1110, Consumer Expenditure Survey, 2016 (cited in note 5).
20 New Strategist Publications, ed, Best Customers: Demographics of Consumer
Demand 146 (New Strategist 9th ed 2012).
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 Id at 3.
24 New Strategist, ed, Best Customers at 146 (cited in note 20).
25 Id at 147.
26 Id.
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$20,000.27 The former group scores 28 on the Best Customers
Index, while the latter scores 303.28
Household type also affects the probability that a household
will spend resources on streaming and downloading audio. A
household with a married couple in which the oldest child is be-
tween the ages of six and seventeen spends an average of $16.15
on consumption of audio content, which gives it a score of 241 on
the Best Customers Index, while a household consisting of a sin-
gle parent with one or more children under eighteen will spend
an average of $2.38, which gives it a score of 36 on the Index.29
Black households spend an average of $4.24 (a score of 63), while
non-Hispanic whites spend an average of $7.44 (a score of 111).30
Education appears to be an even more important factor.
There appears to be a strong positive correlation between educa-
tion level and consumption of copyrighted content. A household
with no high school graduates spends an average of $0.87 on digi-
tal audio content (a score of 13), while a household with a holder
of a master’s degree spends an average of $16.18 (a score of 241).31
Region may also affect users’ propensity to consume copy-
righted content: an average southern family spends $5.12 (a
score of 76), while an average midwestern household spends an
average of $8.33 (a score of 124).32 The data further indicate that
a black southern family with a child under the age of eighteen
and a single parent age seventy-five and above who has not
graduated high school has a virtually zero probability of spend-
ing money on streamed or downloaded audio.33
The data regarding spending on streaming and downloading
of video content based on income are not fundamentally differ-
ent. While, in general, the effect of income on the categories of
27 Id.
28 New Strategist, ed, Best Customers at 147 (cited in note 20).
29 Id.
30 Id.
31 Id.
32 New Strategist, ed, Best Customers at 147 (cited in note 20).
33 We have not been able to obtain the full data set on which the analysis of the Best
Customers Index relies. The data available online from the Bureau of Labor Statistics have
only a general category for entertainment and do not split it into its components. See
Table 1110: Consumer Expenditure Survey, 2016 (cited in note 5). As a result, we are not
able to determine at this stage the interdependence of these factors, and thus we are un-
able to determine the exact probability that such a household would spend resources on
this category. Nonetheless, the data regarding expenses on streaming and downloading
video content expose that the correlation between the categories is not very strong. The
relationship between the categories is fairly different in the two cases, negating the pos-
sibility of strong interdependence.
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consumption is weaker, there are other categories in which the
differences are more pronounced. The effect of household income
on expenditures in this category is weaker: the average monthly
spending of a household with an income of less than $20,000 is
$0.57, while that of a household with an income of above $100,000
is $4.98.34 The score of the latter on the Best Customers Index is
257, which is significantly lower than the score of 303 it receives
on the streaming and downloading of audio content.35
The differences are also less pronounced among different
household types. The household type with the highest average
consumption (married couples with children aged six to seven-
teen) spends on average $3.04, while the household type with
the lowest (single parents with children under the age of eight-
een) spends an average of $0.80.36 This means that the differ-
ence in spending between the highest and lowest categories is
only four-to-one, significantly less than the gap in audio con-
sumption, which was almost eight times greater.37
Yet in some demographic categories, the difference is more
pronounced for video. Black households spend an average of
$0.80 in comparison to non-Hispanic white households, which
average $2.11—over two and a half times more.38 For audio,
they spend less than two times more.39 Black households’ Best
Customers Index score drops from 63 for audio to 41 for video.40
II. ANALYSIS OF COMSCORE DATA
There are two methods by which ComScore reaches out to
these households. The first is through the “Affiliate Program,”
in which users receive direct invitations to download software
that would enable ComScore to collect information about all
browsing activity in the household.41 Users are not paid. The
incentive to participate is intrinsic. The second is through
third-party application providers that offer incentives to visi-
tors in exchange for exposing visitors to offers, including
34 New Strategist, ed, Best Customers at 149 (cited in note 20).
35 Id at 147, 149.
36 Id at 149.
37 Id at 147, 149.
38 New Strategist, ed, Best Customers at 149 (cited in note 20).
39 See text accompanying note 30.
40 New Strategist, ed, Best Customers at 146–47 (cited in note 20).
41 ComScore Media Metrix Description of Methodology *3 (ComScore, Nov 2013),
archived at http://perma.cc/P3T4-U3XZ.
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solicitations from ComScore.42 Yet no incentive is tied to the ac-
ceptance of the offer from ComScore.43 ComScore also collects
users’ household-level demographics, which it supplements
with third-party data from Accudata and behavior-based model-
ing.44 ComScore panel data is weighted in order to reflect the
universe of internet users in the United States.45
We have obtained ComScore data for two categories of
online purchases relevant to our Essay: Purchase of Music
(ComScore category twenty-two) and Purchase of Movies and
Videos (ComScore category twenty-three).46 The data set con-
tains observations for 81,417 households. It contains 3,315 ob-
servations of audio content purchased by households and 10,726
observations of video content purchased by households. Because
our main interest is the characteristics of households that do not
buy copyrighted materials, we divided these households into two
types: households that have purchased certain forms of copy-
righted material—audio or video—and households that have not
purchased those forms of material. Because there are numerous
households that have purchased one or more products in either
category, the number of households that haven’t purchased any
product is 1,577 for audio and 4,467 for video (see Tables 1 and 2).
42 Id at *4.
43 Id.
44 Id.
45 ComScore Methodology at *3 (cited in note 41). Yet even if perfectly weighted,
this data set faces serious methodological limitations due to the selection biases of the
individuals willing to share their browsing activity. This is especially relevant with re-
spect to the household income variable: even if the panel includes high-income house-
holds, it is questionable whether these households actually reflect the typical behavior of
high-income households. The fact that they are willing to expose to third parties their
browsing activity in exchange for some form of benefit reflects, to some extent, that their
resources are limited. Otherwise they could have purchased an equivalent benefit with-
out exposing their browsing behavior to third parties.
46 There were no other categories useful for our purposes. ComScore does not have
a category for streaming services—it does have a category of online content sales and
online service subscriptions, but it does not include streaming services like Netflix for
video and Spotify for audio. The reason for this is that, for such services, a one-time pur-
chase is sufficient to consume the service for a long period of time, and thus reviewing
the purchases made online will not effectively capture these forms of consumption.
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TABLE 1: AUDIO CONTENT PURCHASES BY HOUSEHOLDS
Audio Frequency Percent Cumulative
0 79,840 98.06 98.06
1 1,577 1.94 100.00
Total 81,417 100.00
TABLE 2: VIDEO CONTENT PURCHASES BY HOUSEHOLDS
Video Frequency Percent Cumulative
0 76,950 94.51 94.51
1 4,467 5.49 100.00
Total 81,417 100.00
For each of the households, the data contain nine parame-
ters: Education Level of the Head of Household, Census Region,
Household Size, Oldest Age of the Head of Household,
Household Income, Racial Background, Connection Speed,
Country of Origin, and Zip Code.
We set out to examine whether these parameters are corre-
lated and have predictive power for whether a household with
certain characteristics would purchase a protected copyright
product. For this purpose, we ran a logistic regression, which is
most fitting given the binary character of the dependent varia-
ble. For audio consumption, four of the independent variables
were statistically significant: Racial Background and Age with
strong significance (p < 0.01) and Census Region and Income
with weaker significance (p < 0.05). Non–African American
households (African American households are denoted by the
number “3” in Table 3), older heads of households, and low-
income households have a higher probability of not purchasing
audio content. Among the variables, racial background has the
highest coefficient and therefore seems to have the strongest
impact.
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TABLE 3: LOGISTIC REGRESSION RESULTS FOR AUDIO CONTENT
PURCHASES
Audio Coeff Std Err z P > |z| [95% Conf Interval]
Most Education
(Head of
Household)
0.0586541 0.0338642 1.73 0.083* −0.0077184 0.1250266
Census Region
2 −0.240163 0.0829241 −0.29 0.772 −0.1865444 0.1385119
3 −1.662921 0.0748991 −2.22 0.026*** −0.3130917 −0.0194926
4 −0.0343664 0.0849173 −0.40 0.686 −0.2008013 0.1320685
Household Size −0.0048801 0.0207302 −0.24 0.814 −0.0455105 0.0357503
Oldest Age Head of
Household
0.0761591 0.011749 6.48 0.000*** 0.0531315 0.0991867
Household Income 0.0318705 0.0146177 2.18 0.029** 0.0032204 0.0605206
Racial Background
2 −0.9354766 0.1186563 −7.88 0.000*** −1.168039 −0.7029146
3 −0.4714563 0.1202855 −3.92 0.000*** −0.7072116 −0.2357011
5
−0.9063577 0.0922049 -9.83 0.000 −1.087076 −0.7256395
Country of Origin
1 0.1004516 0.0935218 1.07 0.283 −0.0828478 0.2837509
_cons −4.496677 0.2318364 −19.40 0.000 −4.951068 −4.042286
* For Census Region: 1 = North East, 2 = North Central, 3 = South, 4 = West. For Racial Background:
1 = Caucasian, 2 = African American, 3 = Asian, 5 = Unknown. For Country of Origin: 1 = Hispanic, 2 = Non-
Hispanic.
We have received similar results with regard to household
consumption of video content. Racial Background and Age of
Households remain strongly statistically significant (p < 0.01),
joined by Region, which had enhanced statistical significance
(p < 0.001). Household Income maintains its weaker statistical
significance (p < 0.05), while Education loses its statistical
significance.
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TABLE 4: LOGISTIC REGRESSION RESULTS FOR VIDEO CONTENT
PURCHASES
Video Coeff Std Err z P > |z| [95% Conf Interval]
Most Education
(Head of
Household)
0.0123945 0.020856 0.59 0.552 −0.0284825 0.0532714
Census Region
2 −0.0981939 0.0508895 −1.93 0.054 −0.1979355 0.0015476
3 −0.235507 0.0455328 −5.17 0.000*** −0.3247496 −0.1462644
4 −0.1264669 0.0523088 −2.42 0.016 −0.2289902 −0.0239435
Household Size −0.0004744 0.0126332 −0.04 0.970 −0.025235 0.0242861
Oldest Age
Head of House-
hold
0.0292329 0.006974 4.19 0.000*** 0.0155642 0.0429016
Household In-
come
0.0201468 0.0089904 2.24 0.025** 0.0025259 0.0377677
Racial Back-
ground
2 −0.7697772 0.0662507 −11.62 0.000*** −0.8996262 −0.6399281
3 −0.3417903 0.070115 −4.87 0.000*** −0.4792132 −0.2043674
5 −0.8136661 0.0538913 −15.10 0.000*** −0.9192911 −0.7080412
Connection
Speed
1.105471 0.2273749 4.86 0.000*** 0.6598242 1.551117
Country of
Origin
1 0.0929469 0.0568445 1.64 0.102 −0.0184662 0.20436
_cons −3.814999 0.2644598 −14.43 0.000 −4.333331 −3.296668
* For Census Region: 1 = North East, 2 = North Central, 3 = South, 4 = West. For Racial Background:
1 = Caucasian, 2 = African American, 3 = Asian, 5 = Unknown. For Country of Origin: 1 = Hispanic, 2 = Non-
Hispanic.
We have also checked for multicollinearity between the var-
iables—that is, whether the explanatory power of some of them
is due to their correlation with other independent variables. One
of the problems with the Best Customers data is that they did
not enable us to check for multicollinearity. We found low levels
of correlation between the dependent variables, which refutes
the possibility of multicollinearity. The correlations between al-
most all of the independent variables are around 0.1 or lower—
except for the correlation between income and education, which
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scored 0.379, representing some degree of correlation but not a
strong correlation.
TABLE 5: CORRELATION OF INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
M
ostE
ducation
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ousehold
Size
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H
ead
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ousehold
Incom
e
R
acial
B
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C
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O
rigin
Most Education Head
of Household 1.000
Census Region 0.0562 1.000
Household Size −0.0265 −0.0101 1.000
Oldest Age Head of
Household
0.0369 −0.0169 −0.0887 1.000
Household Income
0.3796 −0.0195 0.1130 0.0160 1.000
Racial Background
−0.0357 0.0871 0.0594 −0.0949 −0.0436 1.000
Country of Origin
−0.0676 0.0660 0.0639 −0.0425 −0.0510 0.1768 1.000
III. DISCUSSION OF RESULTS
Some of our findings, such as the lower expectancy of south-
erners to buy protected video and audio material and the lower
expectancy of lower-income households to buy such material, re-
inforce the limited data from the Best Customers survey.
The four statistically significant parameters enable us to de-
fine a cohort that does not consume any of the copyrighted ma-
terial we discuss in this Essay. In the case of audio, out of the
cohort of southern households (Census Region = 3) in which the
head of the household has no college degree (Most Education—
Head of Household ≤ 2) and is twenty-four years old or younger
(Oldest Age Head of Household ≤ 2), and in which household in-
come is less than $100,000 (Household Income ≤ 15) and the ra-
cial background is not African American (Racial Back-
ground ≠ 3)—a cohort of 176 households—not one household
purchased any copyrighted audio content online in 2016.
In the case of video, in the cohort of southern households
with incomes of less than $100,000 (Household Income ≤ 15) and
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in which the head of household did not attend college (Most
Education—Head of Household ≤ 1), is twenty-nine years old or
younger (Oldest Age Head of Household ≤ 3), and whose racial
background is not African American (Racial Background ≠ 3)—a
cohort of seventy-two households—not one household purchased
any copyrighted video content online in 2016. While this cohort
is smaller than the one defined for nonconsumption of audio, its
greater divergence from the mean of purchasing households,
which was more than double that of audio (over 4 percent in
comparison to over 2 percent), compensates for its smaller size.
If these findings could have been extended to other forms of
purchases and actually reflected the total consumption of copy-
righted content, a legal regime that reduced the liability of
members of such households for copyright infringements—and
even granted them complete immunity—would seem likely to
have no effect on authors’ incentives to create. The expectation
that such households would purchase copyrighted material is
close to zero, and thus exempting them from liability would in-
crease the welfare of these defined cohorts without adversely af-
fecting the remuneration of authors.
An important question that arises from the analysis of the
data is: What should actually be measured, purchases or con-
sumption? Analysis of purchases provides information regarding
the households’ actual willingness to pay. Yet some may argue
that purchases are not necessarily the only relevant parameter.
Rather, the relevant parameter may be valuation of the product,
which is distinct from willingness to pay. There may be some
households that attribute high value to the consumption of copy-
righted material but do not attribute high value to consuming
this content legally. Even though they attribute high value to
the consumption of content, they may not purchase it because
they can download it illegally. Such households are potential
customers of creators of content and would start paying if an ef-
fective enforcement mechanism were to arise. Thus, in order to
fully estimate the potential customers of copyrighted content,
one has to collect data regarding all forms of consumption of the
product and not only purchases. How these data should be ana-
lyzed in order to deduce valuation from consumption is a sepa-
rate issue that should be addressed when the data are available.
It is not necessarily true that consumption data are irrele-
vant for the purpose of personalizing copyright law. From the
point of view of owners of protected content, what matters is the
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actual purchases, not why one does not purchase—whether be-
cause of low valuation of the product or low valuation of legal
consumption. It is true that, if the latter is correct, enhanced en-
forcement may increase the number of purchasing households.
Yet our Essay is focused on personalization of copyright assum-
ing that enforcement level is fixed.
Furthermore, it is possible to argue that the phenomenon of
illegal consumption supports the adoption of personalized copy-
right law. If the demand for copyrighted material is relatively
inelastic for certain households, and they would consume ap-
proximately the same level of copyrighted content legally or ille-
gally, social welfare may increase by transforming the consump-
tion of such households into legal forms of consumption. Illegal
behavior constitutes a per se cost besides the social cost of the
consequences of the illegal behavior. As Professor Robert Cooter
has noted, “Internalizing a social norm is a moral commitment
that attaches a psychological penalty to a forbidden act.”47 Once
an individual transgresses the law in one field and incurs the
cost of being a transgressor, one is more likely to transgress the
law in other fields—even if prior to that act, the individual
would not have made these additional transgressions—because
the first transgression reduces the marginal cost of the next.48
47 Robert Cooter, Expressive Law and Economics, 27 J Legal Stud 585, 586 (1998).
For a discussion of the phenomenon of “self-concept maintenance” and its relevance to the
legal field, see Yuval Feldman, Behavioral Ethics Meets Behavioral Law and Economics, in
Eyal Zamir and Doron Teichman, eds, The Oxford Handbook of Behavioral Economics and
the Law 213, 222–23 (Oxford 2014).
48 This is an additional rationale for personalization of law—not different levels of
benefits or direct social costs resulting from an action, but different indirect levels of so-
cial costs of the transgression per se. Certain types of individuals transgress a certain
law but would not have transgressed if the legal prohibition had been limited to more
severe acts, increasing the social cost of their classification as transgressors.
For example, the conventional way of applying personalized driving laws would be to
differentiate between drivers who, driving at the same speed, impose different social
risks. The more talented Type A drivers may impose only a 0.0001 risk of an accident
when driving at sixty miles per hour, and reach a 0.001 risk level only when driving at
seventy miles per hour. The less talented Type B drivers may reach the risk level of
0.001 driving at sixty miles per hour. This is the conventional setting for personalizing
the law: the law would prohibit driving while imposing more than a 0.001 risk of an ac-
cident, permitting Type A drivers to drive up to a speed of seventy miles per hour and
Type B drivers to drive up to a speed of sixty miles per hour.
The rationale provided above would justify personalization of law even if individuals
impose the same social cost at a given speed and receive the same personal benefit from
driving fast, as long as they diverged in their valuations of driving legally. For example,
Type C drivers, who do not attribute so much value to driving legally as to justify barring
them from the benefit of driving at eighty miles per hour if the legal speed were sixty miles
per hour, may still attribute sufficient value to driving legally to keep their speed at
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IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR LEGAL POLICY
The availability of personalized consumption data has the
potential to transform copyright law in three different ways:
First, it will reduce the deadweight loss associated with copy-
right protection. Second, it calls for the adoption of differential
statutory damages categories that take into account users’ pro-
pensities to pay for copyrighted content. Finally, it provides a
prima facie case for exempting users with certain characteristics
from copyright liability. We discuss these implications in order.
A. Deadweight Loss
It is a well-established result in the economic literature that
copyright protection cannot yield a first-best result.49 Copyright
law incentivizes creativity by conferring legal exclusivity on au-
thors. That same exclusivity allows creators to engage in su-
pracompetitive pricing. Copyright protection, therefore, invaria-
bly gives rise to a deadweight loss, represented by the loss of
those users who would have purchased the content at the com-
petitive price but not at the supracompetitive price.50 Naturally,
in a world with perfect information, copyright owners—indeed,
all monopolists—would prefer to adopt a differential pricing
scheme that allows them fully to extract the surplus of users.51
Alas, copyright owners were unable until recently to figure
out users’ reserve prices. The availability of personalized data
about consumers allows copyright owners to offer content at
seventy miles per hour if that were the legally permitted speed. In contrast, Type D
drivers, who attribute high value to driving legally, would drive at sixty miles per hour if
that were the legally permitted speed. Such situations may also justify personalization.
In order to avoid the social cost of turning Type D drivers into transgressors, the legally
permitted speed that would apply to them would be seventy miles per hour, while the
one that would apply to Type C drivers would be sixty miles per hour.
This personalization may raise much greater fairness and equality concerns if we
permit certain individuals to impose greater social risks than others. Yet it is possible to
justify such personalization on fairness grounds because, in the same way progressive
taxes are justified from an egalitarian perspective, they maintain equal sacrifice. Also, in
this case, it can be argued that the personalized driving law maintains equal sacrifice of
drivers for the sake of public safety. The subjective sacrifice that Type C drivers make
for public safety is equivalent to the subjective sacrifice Type D drivers make for public
safety.
49 See, for example, Bell and Parchomovsky, 113 Mich L Rev at 240–41 (cited in
note 4); Danny Ben-Shahar and Assaf Jacob, Selective Enforcement of Copyright as an
Optimal Monopolistic Behavior, 3 Contributions to Econ Analysis & Pol 1, 14–18 (2004);
Landes and Posner, 18 J Legal Stud at 351–52 (cited in note 1).
50 See Bell and Parchomovsky, 113 Mich L Rev at 240–41 (cited in note 4).
51 See id.
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different prices to members of different groups. Actually, many
of them are already taking advantage of this possibility. From a
policy perspective, this dynamic has the salutary effect of dimin-
ishing the deadweight loss associated with copyright protection.
The reduction in this deadweight loss should come as welcome
news to both authors and users. Authors, for their part, will see
greater rewards for their creative efforts. And more users will
gain access to copyrighted content.
It should be noted that personalization may also generate a
deadweight loss. A personalized regime may generate a cost for
an individual who wants an attribute on which the personaliza-
tion is based. For example, an individual may want to move
from the southern United States to the Northeast. As a conse-
quence of the personalization of copyright protection based on
one’s domicile, changing one’s residence might increase the price
that one is charged for copyrighted content. This, in turn, might
distort one’s decision about where to live. The distortion could
also work in the opposite direction: a person whose preference is
to live in the Northeast may choose to live in the South in order
to decrease her expenses on consumption of copyrighted goods.
While it is true, in principle, that a personalized copyright may
not only eliminate a deadweight loss but also generate another,
it seems that the deadweight it eliminates is much greater than
the one it generates. First, personalization can also be based on
parameters that the individual cannot alter, such as age, height,
or ethnicity, and thus personalization will have no distortionary
effect. Second, it is highly unlikely that the distortionary effect
of personalization will be significant. The amount a household
can save by reducing expenses on copyrighted content is negligi-
ble: as noted in the Best Customers Index, the average house-
hold spends $6.70 annually on audio copyrighted material.52 It is
doubtful that this amount would cause any significant changes
in an individual’s behavior. Changing one’s domicile in order to
lower this amount would be highly irrational. The potential cost
savings that can be realized by moving will be dwarfed by the
moving costs. Therefore, it seems safe to assume that the social
gains from the reduction of the deadweight loss of copyright pro-
tection via the creation of a personalized copyright regime would
dominate the effect of enhancing a tax-like deadweight loss by
distorting individuals’ behavior.
52 New Strategist, ed, Best Customers at 147 (cited in note 20).
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B. Statutory Damages
The Copyright Act of 197653 provides copyright owners with
a wide array of remedies, including statutory damages.54 Statu-
tory damages have proven to be an especially popular remedy,
as the actual harm suffered by copyright owners from various
infringements is often very hard to prove and quantify.55 It is
unsurprising, therefore, that statutory damages are the remedy
of choice for many copyright owners.56 Section 504(c) of the
Copyright Act empowers owners to receive statutory damages that
range between $750 and $30,000 for standard infringements.57
At present, and this has always been the case historically,
statutory damages are never adjusted based on user character-
istics. In the past, doing so was not even an option, as infor-
mation about the consumption patterns of users did not exist.
Our analysis suggests that, in the future, it may be possible—
indeed, desirable—to vary statutory damages awards based on
the personal characteristics of infringers. As we suggest, users
with certain characteristics are highly unlikely to purchase copy-
righted content. If such individuals are sued for infringement,
the damages imposed on them should reflect the fact that their
infractions do not represent lost sales. New categories of lower
statutory damages should be adopted, or at a minimum, courts
and juries ought to adjust the awards granted under the present
scheme against users from the groups we identify.
Relatedly, the type of copyrighted work involved in the in-
fringement action must also be taken into account. Our analysis
reveals that users’ consumption patterns vary among categories
of works. Individuals with certain characteristics may abstain
53 Pub L No 94-553, 90 Stat 2541, codified at 17 USC § 101 et seq.
54 17 USC § 504.
55 Indeed, the desire to help copyright owners overcome difficult evidentiary
problems is often cited as the primary justification for allowing them to collect statu-
tory damages. See, for example, Colin Morrissey, Behind the Music: Determining the
Relevant Constitutional Standard for Statutory Damages in Copyright Infringement
Lawsuits, 78 Fordham L Rev 3059, 3071–72 (2010); Stephanie Berg, Remedying the
Statutory Damages Remedy for Secondary Copyright Infringement Liability:
Balancing Copyright and Innovation in the Digital Age, 56 J Copyright Society USA
265, 274 (2009).
56 See Ben Depoorter, Copyright Enforcement in the Digital Age: When the Remedy
Is the Wrong, 66 UCLA L Rev *7 (forthcoming 2019) (on file with authors) (reporting that
“[p]laintiffs in copyright litigation request statutory damages in eight[y]-nine percent of
cases”).
57 If the infringement is willful, the amount goes up to $150,000; in the case of an
innocent infringement, courts can lower the amount to $200. See 17 USC § 504(c)(2).
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from consuming a particular type of copyrighted works, say audio,
and at the same time engage in heavy consumption of another
category of protected content, say video.
It may also be advisable to distinguish among consumer
profiles of different genres of music and movies. Our data reveal
that, among the purchasers of copyrighted content, there are
certain cohorts whose expectancy of purchasing a particular
genre may be close to zero. For example, consumers who are
willing to pay for hip-hop music may abstain from buying coun-
try music (and vice versa). In determining statutory damages,
courts ought to be mindful of this possibility.
Aside from the general welfare argument for personalizing
copyright infringement penalties, personalization according to
genres may serve an additional purpose that some scholars be-
lieve is of high social value: enhancement of cultural diversity.58
Enabling individuals to freely consume genres to which they
would never have been exposed benefits all parties involved.
C. Exempting Certain Users from Copyright Liability
The most extreme version of a personalized copyright re-
gime would grant full immunity from copyright liability to co-
horts with an especially low propensity to purchase copyrighted
content. Individuals within the cohort would be allowed to en-
gage in private consumption of copyrighted content free of risk
and free of charge as long as they do not share the content with
other individuals. While such a legal regime may appear ex-
treme, it is not unprecedented: in some legal systems, private
usage, including even copying copyrighted material for private
purposes, is permitted across the board.59 Our proposal is more
moderate: permitting private use by members of certain cohorts.
If the expectancy of purchases by members of a certain cohort is
close to zero, permitting these individuals to consume the copy-
righted content would inflict only a minimal harm on copyright
owners and would only slightly diminish their incentive to create.
58 See, for example, Bhikhu Parekh, Rethinking Multiculturalism: Cultural Diversity
and Political Theory 165–78 (Harvard 2000). Some justify cultural diversity from an eco-
nomic lens by referencing the positive externalities generated by cultural diversity. See,
for example, Gianmarco I.P. Ottaviano and Giovanni Peri, The Economic Value of
Cultural Diversity: Evidence from US Cities, 6 J Econ Geography 9, 38 (2006).
59 For example, in Norway, copying copyrighted works for private use, such as
downloading songs, is permitted. See Tarja Koskinen-Olsson, The Notion of Private
Copying in Nordic Copyright Legislation in the Light of European Developments dur-
ing Recent Years, 49 J Copyright Society USA 1003, 1012–13 (2002).
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A full immunity scheme has one central advantage over the
alternative of reduced statutory damages. Both options aim at
enabling wider use of copyrighted content by cohorts with low
propensity to purchase. Yet the latter approach does so by in-
creasing the prevalence of an illegal activity: it decreases the
cost of violating copyright law, but the nonpurchasing cohorts
consuming copyright freely are still violating copyright law. In-
creasing copyright consumption by increasing the economic in-
centive to violate copyright law generates the additional social
costs associated with violating the law detailed above. The for-
mer does not raise this problem. It does not increase copyright
consumption of the nonpurchasing cohorts by increasing their
economic incentive to violate the law. It excludes the legal limi-
tations of copyright from applying to such cohorts from the start
and excludes them from being legally defined as violators.
Yet the deferential penalty treatment may better suit cases
in which the propensity of certain cohorts is low but not close to
zero. In such cases, permitting the cohort to consume the copy-
right freely would damage the copyright. In contrast, lowering
the effective sanction may function as a self-selection device, en-
abling individuals who would not otherwise purchase the copy-
right to consume it.
V. THE LIMITS OF MARKET-BASED PERSONALIZATION
Theoretically, copyright owners can lower the price charged
to almost zero for individuals who put a very low value on the
use of copyrighted content and would not have used the content
otherwise. This raises the question: If private actors have access
to big data and can engage in price differentiation, why adopt a
personalized copyright regime? One may argue that legal inter-
vention is unwarranted in this case because the market will in-
duce copyright owners to harness big data in order to engage in
personalized pricing.
There are several problems with this argument. First, the
motivation of copyright owners to expend resources to capture
low-value users critically depends on the legal regime that applies
to the owners and defines the scope of their rights. Extant copy-
right law allows copyright owners to seek statutory damages be-
tween $750 to $30,000 for standard infringements60 and increases
60 17 USC § 504(c)(1).
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the amount to up to $150,000 for willful infringements.61 These
are significant amounts. Instead of engaging in price discrimina-
tion that would enable them to capture the surplus of low-value
users, copyright owners are likely to find it in their interests to
allow low-value users to breach and then sue for statutory dam-
ages. The availability of statutory damages under current law,
therefore, changes the calculus of copyright owners. Against the
current legal background, copyright owners will likely be better
off if they forgo the opportunity to devise a comprehensive indi-
vidualized pricing scheme and adopt instead a strategy of selec-
tive enforcement.62 It should be borne in mind that, under the
existing copyright system, inframarginal users are not exempt
from liability. Collecting statutory damages even from a rela-
tively small percentage of inframarginal users is likely to be
more cost-effective for most copyright owners than incurring the
cost of offering them low prices, although it would clearly be less
fair.
Second, irrespective of the applicable legal regime, cost con-
straints may prevent copyright owners from reaching out to low-
value users. The graph below, in Figure 1, exemplifies this pos-
sibility through designating the demand curve for a certain
copyrighted content. Without price discrimination, copyright
owners would set the price at the monopoly price, designated
Pmon. The owners’ surplus would be the square area marked with
horizontal lines, and the consumers’ surplus would be the area
above that marked with vertical lines. When copyright owners
shift to price discrimination, they add to their surplus the two
areas marked with vertical lines. But price discrimination is
cost-justifiable only to a certain point, designated Pmin. Beyond
this point, it is not cost-effective for copyright owners to continue
to expend resources on price discrimination even though theoret-
ically they could also add to their surplus the area marked in
black. This is due, of course, to the cost associated with the prac-
tice of price discrimination. Price discrimination requires acquir-
ing data and analyzing it. Naturally, the acquisition of data can
61 17 USC § 504(c)(2). Willful infringement has been defined as covering situations
in which (a) “the defendant was actually aware of the infringing activity, or” (b) “the de-
fendant’s actions were the result of ‘reckless disregard’ for, or ‘willful blindness’ to, the
copyright holder’s rights.” See Island Software & Computer Service, Inc v Microsoft Corp,
413 F3d 257, 263 (2d Cir 2005).
62 For a discussion of selective enforcement, which occurs when copyright holders
enforce claims against only certain infringers, see generally Ben-Shahar and Jacob, 3
Contributions to Econ Analysis & Pol 1 (cited in note 49).
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be rather costly. For the group of individuals comprising the
black-tailed area, it might not be worthwhile to acquire data re-
garding their willingness to pay. The expected price the copy-
right owners can obtain from this group of individuals is lower
than the cost of obtaining data regarding each individual’s will-
ingness to pay. Hence, the copyright owners would abstain from
price discriminating within that group altogether.
FIGURE 1: PRICE DISCRIMINATION AMONG COPYRIGHT
OWNERS
Because of the low amount that copyright owners can
charge to the individuals comprising the black-tailed area, the
transaction costs may exceed the expected price, making it un-
profitable for the owners to sell users the right to use the copy-
righted material in a market transaction. As a result, market-
based price discrimination would reduce the deadweight loss
associated with copyright protection, but not within the black-
tailed area: it would bar those individuals from consuming the
copyrighted material even though their consumption would have
generated a net surplus equivalent to the area of the black-
tailed area. A personalized copyright regime internalizes this
welfare loss that private actors do not internalize. Hence, a per-
sonalized copyright regime can eradicate the deadweight loss of
copyright that market-based personalization leaves intact.63
63 There might be an additional justification for personalization of copyright, even
in cases in which the inframarginal consumers attribute zero value to the copyrighted
content and the black-tailed area does not exist. Under market-based personalization, if
the inframarginal consumers attribute zero value to the copyrighted content, they would
never consume the copyrighted material—no one would market the material to them be-
cause there is nothing to gain. In contrast, a personalized copyright regime would enable
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CONCLUSION
In this Essay, we laid out the case for adopting a personal-
ized copyright regime in which the penalties for copyright in-
fringement would be lowered for cohorts with a low propensity
to purchase copyrighted content. Big data has already trans-
formed the ways in which copyrighted material is created.64 We
argue that it should also transform the way copyright is protected
in order to enhance social welfare. It is time for copyright law to
join other legal fields, such as contracts65 and torts,66 in which
scholars have argued that big data enables reforms and person-
alization of the legal standards in those fields, thereby enhanc-
ing efficiency.
The logic of the argument in this Essay could apply to the
consumption of public goods in general and, more specifically, to
the field of taxation. The central attribute that enables the ap-
plication of our argument to copyright is that additional con-
sumption does not impose any additional costs on the manufac-
turers of the resources consumed (that is, copyrighted content).
This is true also in the case of classic public goods, which have a
central characteristic of being nonrival—that is, consumption of
the resource by one individual does not preclude other individuals
them to consume the copyrighted material at no cost. This may also seem pointless: if
these individuals attribute zero value to the consumption of the copyrighted material,
there is no social welfare gain even if they do consume the copyrighted material. Yet ac-
cording to certain approaches that attribute positive value to cultural diversity, such
consumption may still have a positive value. Without a personalized copyright regime,
those groups will never be exposed to the cultural experiences involved in using the
copyrighted material, and thus society as a whole suffers a lack of cultural diversity.
The positive value of cultural diversity exists within the welfare economics framework,
because it generates positive externalities, or as a source of value per se outside the
realm of conventional welfare economics. See, for example, Heritiana Ranaivoson,
Does the Consumer Value Diversity? How the Economists’ Standard Hypothesis Is
Being Challenged, in Marilena Vecco, ed, The Consumption of Culture, the Culture of
Consumption: A Collection of Contributions on Cultural Consumption and Cultural
Markets 70, 77–79 (Lambert 2012) (discussing the sociological and psychological bene-
fits of cultural diversity); David Throsby, The Economics of Cultural Policy 172–73
(Cambridge 2010) (listing four benefits of cultural diversity as cultural capital).
64 See Michael D. Smith and Rahul Telang, Streaming, Sharing and Stealing: Big
Data and the Future of Entertainment 3–15 (MIT 2016) (describing how Netflix changed
the way in which TV series are produced, including by being willing to forgo the creation
of a pilot episode, based on its big data regarding consumer preferences).
65 See Ariel Porat and Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Personalizing Default Rules and
Disclosure with Big Data, 112 Mich L Rev 1417, 1422–33 (2014).
66 See Omri Ben-Shahar and Ariel Porat, Personalizing Negligence Law, 91 NYU L
Rev 627, 676–88 (2016).
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from consuming the resource.67 It is possible to utilize big data to
price discriminate between individuals consuming public goods
in order to reach an optimal level of consumption of those public
goods. This suggestion is not far from one of the major justifica-
tions for progressive taxation: the benefit principle.68 According
to the benefit principle, one’s payment for public goods should be
in proportion to the benefit or utility one derives from the exist-
ence of the public good.69 In this sense, levels of income serve as
a proxy for the degree of benefit people derive from public
goods.70 According to such logic, in an era of big data, there may
be less reason to settle for such a rough proxy for the level of
benefit: the tax system can use much more sophisticated param-
eters than income to measure the level of benefit that one de-
rives from public goods, and maybe even use those parameters
to measure the level of benefit that one derives from the music
that one purchases.
67 See Paul A. Samuelson, The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure, 36 Rev Econ &
Statistics 387, 387 (1954).
68 Various forms of the benefit principle and the premise that underpins it—that
taxation is a price for services rendered—were expressed by various classical thinkers,
such as Hobbes, Locke, Grotius, and Pufendorf. For the historical intellectual roots of the
principle, see Richard A. Musgrave, The Theory of Public Finance: A Study in Public
Economy 63–73 (McGraw-Hill 1959); Edwin R.A. Seligman, Progressive Taxation in
Theory and Practice 79–86 (American Economic Association 1894). For its modern formu-
lation, as it is mostly identified, see Friedrich A. Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty 315–
16 (Chicago 1960).
69 Hayek, Constitution of Liberty at 315–16 (cited in note 68).
70 For arguments supporting the assumption that higher-income earners derive
greater benefits from public goods, see Yoseph Edrey, Constitutional Review and Tax
Law: An Analytic Framework, 56 Am U L Rev 1187, 1209–13 (2007); C. Eugene Steuerle,
And Equal (Tax) Justice for All?, reprinted in Joseph J. Thorndike and Dennis J. Ventry
Jr, eds, Tax Justice: The Ongoing Debate 253, 261–63 (Urban Institute 2002). For an ex-
ample of how even a regressive tax provides more benefits to higher-income earners, see id
at 268–70. But see Walter Blum and Harry Kalven Jr, The Uneasy Case for Progressive
Taxation, 19 U Chi L Rev 417, 451–55 (1952).
